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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH

F-<\lj(:ONAERO ENTERPRISE,
INC., n Utah Corporation, and
ClfARijES W. TAGGART,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-\'S.-

JOHN F. BOWERS, et al,
Defendants,

Case
No.10173

INTERMOUNTAIN DEVELOP1\tiENT, INC., a Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESP'ONDENTS' BRIEF

RESPONDENTS'

STAT~MENT

OF FACTS

Appellant's Statement of Facts is not objective, is
consistently argumentative in favor of the appellant and
significantly omits some very material facts. The following should be added to modify appellant's Statement
of Facts in order to at least give a fair statement of
the case.
1
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Defendant-appellant did not establish a fee title back
to the patentee (Pre-trial Exhibit 3, defendant's abstract.) 1
Respondent-plaintiff paid all of the taxes, delinquency penalties, interest and costs for the years 1949
through 1954 (R. 56, 67-69). Falconero paid the general
taxes on time and without delinquency for the years 1955
through 1961 (R. 69, Exhibit P. 30).
Respondent Falconero erected and maintained a
barbed wire and electric wire fence completely around
the property (R. 31, 43, 57) from 1949 through 1962 (R.
34). The land in question was used as part of a larger
tract of 1,000 acres owned by Falconero for horseback
riding, pasturing and a combination recreation area (R.
41-42). The combination recreation area included the
facilities of the Chuck Wagon Restaurant, stables and
lake.
The appellant was never in possession of the land
nor did the appellant or anyone make any claim to possession or use of the property adverse to that of Falconaero (R. 43, 57, 85, 86).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT FA L C 0 N A E R 0 ENTERPRISE, INC., WAS A PROPER PLAINTIFF.
--,-At page 15 of said Exhibit is a deed to Carrie A. Dunlevy. At page 16
is a deed to Genevieve J. Callister, wife of counsel for appellant, from
C. Athleta Dunlevy Tearney, the daughter of one of the heirs at law
of 0. M. Dunlevy and Carrie A. Dunlevy. Obviously, such a deed
from only one of the alleged heirs, without a probate proceeding or a
determination of heirship proceeding to show the true heirship does
not convey fee tide.

2
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In appellant's Points 1 and 2 counsel for appellant
claims that Falconero Enterprise, Inc., respondent,
could not have brought this action since it had filed its
complaint herein subsequent to the dissolution proceeding. ,\ ppellant makes this contention notwithstanding the
fnct that it admitted in its answer appellant's existence
(H. 5). Thereafter in contradiction appellant amended
its deft•nse just prior to pre-trial (R. 8) .

..:\.ppellant 's contention under this point is obviously
untenable because of the Utah statutes and the general
prineiple of law to the effect that in a dissolution the
corporation is entitled to sue in its own name upon any
cause of action existing at the time of the dissolution.
Section 16-10-11, Utah Code Annotated, as amended,
in the Business Corporation Act provides in part as
follows:
"The dissolution of a corporation ... shall not
take away or impair any remedy available to or
against the corporation, its directors, officers or
shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or
any liability incurred, prior to such dissolution, if
action or other proceeding thereon is commenced
within two years after the date of such dissolution.
Any such action or proceeding by or aga.inst the
corporation may be prosecuted or defended by the
corporation in its corporate name." (Emphasis
added)
The corporation certainly had a claim and a right to
quiet title to this property at the time of the dissolution.
The fact that the property was distributed in the dissolution does not, under said statute, take away the right or
3
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claim existing prior to such dissolution. The statute
very clearly states that the corporation can within two
years bring such an action. This action was commenced
within thirty days after the dissolution.
In the dissolution the corporation conveyed the property by warranty deed, (pre-trial Exhibit 1), to Charles
W. Taggart, Trustee. In addition therefore to the reservation of the right to sue set forth in the statute above,
the corporation had a sufficient property interest by
reason of its obligation on the warranty deed to convey
after acquired title to bring this action. See Section
57-1-10, Utah Code Annotated, Boothe v. Wya.tt, 54 Utah
550, 183 P. 2d 323, and Gulley v. Christian,. 176 P. 2d 812
cited by appellant. In the Gulley case the court in citing
various cases stated, ''a warrantor has sufficient interest
upon which to base a suit in his own name to quiet the
title of his grantee." See also King K ade v. Plummer,
239 Pac. 628 (Okla.); Hacienda Homes v. Peck, 113 P.
2d 487 (Calif.); Piland v. Craig, 154 P. 2d 583 (Okla.);
and the annotation in 97 A. L. R. 711 citing many cases
in support of this general rule.
Appellant cites Wilson v. Kiesel, 9 Utah 397 as support for his position. This case, however, involves the
assignment of a claim after a suit is brought and in a
subsequent suit the assignee is required to sue. Any
different holding would present different issues. Appellant's Gla.s and Chapman. cases appear to be contrary to
the weight of authority.
Thus, Falconero was legally capable of bringing the
lawsuit under the statute and was a proper party plain4
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tiff having sufficient interest under its warranty deed
upon whi('h to bring its action.

POINT II
rl,HE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADDED
CHARLES W. TAGGART AS A PLAINTIFF.
Shortly before trial appellant filed an amended anraising the issue as to the dissolution of Falconaero
I~:ntt'rprit-)e, Inc. Because of this pleading and the argunwnt at pre-trial Charles W. Taggart, Trustee, Grantee
in the warranty deed from Falconaero Enterprise, Inc.,
was added as a plaintiff in the action.

~wPr

Appellant argues in its Point 3 that (a) one, not the
real party in interest can not join the real party in interest in the lawsuit, and (b) that one lacking the legal capacity to sue can not amend the complaint. Neither of
these• contentions are supported by the cases cited by
appellant nor do these propositions have any application
to our case.

(A) ADDING PARTIES PLAINTIFF IS
DISCRETIONARY WITH THE TRIAL
COURT'.
Rule 15 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect
permits the amendment of the complaint. The Utah cases,
including those cited below, uniformly hold that such
amendments are within the discretion of the trial court.
euless the defendant is prejudiced thereby the trial court
LlOPs not abuse its discretion in granting such an amendment and the Supreme Court will not usually interfere.
5
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See Johnson v. Contin,ental Casualty Co., 78 Utah 18, 300
Pac. 1032; Shay v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 47 Utah
252, 153 Pac. 31; and Evans v. Houtz, 57 Utah 216, 193
Pac. 858. See also Plotkinv. Merchants Bank & Trust Co.,
125 S.E. 541 in which the grantor in a quiet title action
had conveyed property and was permitted to amend to
include the grantee as a plaintiff.
Amendments of the pleadings wherein a plaintiff
is added or even substituted come within the purview of
the amendments permitted under ule 15 (a). See the many
cases annotated in 135 AL 325 in support of the general
rule that substitutions of the real party in interest are
permissible.
Rule 21, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"Misjoinder of parties is not grounds for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court or motion of any party
or of its own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just. Any claim against
a party may he severed and proceeded with separately.''
The addition of Mr. Taggart therefore was a mere
formality and does not render the complaint subject to
dismissal. No new issues were raised and appellant was
in no way prejudiced thereby. It would be inequitable
and unnecessary to dismiss the action and require the
plaintiff to proceed through a complete new action upon
the new name. Justice does not countenance this useless
proceeding.
6
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UndPr parag-raph A of appellant's Point 3 it cites
Skewt·s v. [)/fun, 3 Utah 186. In that case, however, the
plaintiff, after obtaining judgment in the Justice's Court
n~~ig-nt-d the notes upon which the judgment was granted
to his wife so that upon appeal by the defendant to the
District Court and in the new trial to be had therein the
wife could testify. She had been precluded from testifying hy statute in the earlier action. This prejudiced
the dt'ft-ndant and the court did not permit a substitution
of the wife as plaintiff. However, it appears that if there
h<H l been no prejudice to the defendant the substitution
would have been permitted. This holding is a far cry
from that contended for by appellant.
(B) INCAPACITY TO SUE DOES NOT
PREVENT JOINING OF ADDITIONAL
PLAINTIFFS.

Appellant repeatedly states that Falconaero had no
legal capacity to sue. This contention, as we have pointed
out under Point I is laid at rest by the statute which in
express language grants the corporation the right to sue
for two years after its dissolution.
However, assuming arguendo that Falconaero had
ceased to do business, the complaint under the liberal
rules and under the weight of authority could still be
amended by adding a property plaintiff. In Lehl v. Strong
J/ ercantile Co., 259 Pac. 512 (Colo.) the court held that
a ror·pora tion eYen though having dissolved could still
bring the action and amend the complaint to substitute
a proper plaintiff. The court in discussing the defendant's contention that the action was a nullity and could
7
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not therefore be amended because of the incapacity of
the plaintiff denied such a contention and stated:
"Of course it is not in fact a nullity; it is a very
real thing, though not a complete action and that
an amendment is possible all know, including those
who say the contrary ... and when we have added
what would have made it a complete action what is
the sense in saying that it is not one."
The court further went on to hold as an additional reason for allowing the amendment that a fiction should
never be allowed to work an injustice and that such an
injustice would be worked by the fiction of holding the
action a nullity. See also the following cases which
have likewise held that a corporation ceasing to do business can substitute another plaintiff; K ehrlein-Swinerton Construction Co. v. Rapkin, 156 Pac. 972 (Calif.);
Hall v. Cutler Bindery Co., 26 P. 2d 1109 (Ore.); and
Norton v. Steinfeld,. 288 Pac. 3 (Ariz.).
Appellant's cited cases under its paragraph B give
him very little help. The St. Marks case is only reported
by syllabi, but it seems to involve a plaintiff designated
only by a description of the hospital instead of as a legal
entity. One of the syllabi states that if the suit had involved the name of a legal person then the substitution
would have been permitted. In the Brooks case the action
was brought after death but prior to probate and simply
in the name of the dead person. In the Mexican Mill case
the plaintiff was designated as follows :
''The plaintiffs, the proprietors of the l\iexican
Mill, a co-partnership doing business in that name
in the county of Ormandy. ''
8
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( )hviously this describes nothing. Whereas our plaintifT, en'n under appellant's theory, was a legal person,
hut had ceased to do business.

It seems reasonable and proper to point out that
appellant's arguments are not supported by the fact nor
by the law. Under the rules and the increasingly practi('11 l a mlliberal application of them the amendment to add
Mr. Taggart is not only legally sound, but equitable. Appellant was in no wise imposed upon by such an amendment.

POINT III
THE COMPLAINT PROPERLY STATED A
CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AND
SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED.
(.A.) .APPELLANT'S POINT 4 IS RAISED
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

Appellant can not now raise this point for the first
time in this court since it did not bring this objection
to the complaint up at any time prior to the filing of appellant's brief herein. (Cite cases.) See Dean. v. Davis,
:24:2 U. S. 438; Idaho State Bank v. Hooper Sugar Co.,
7-l: Utah :24, 276 Pac. 659; 68 A. L. R. 969; and 3 Am. Jur.
paragraphs 316-327.
Appellant contends that the use of the word "inferior" does not show the clear adversity of appellant's
title. Appellant contends that the defense relating to
the failure to state a claim raised this particular point.
How could plaintiff possibly cure any defect in its pleadmgs (if there were any) under a defense so general as
9
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that contended for by appellant. The statement means
little unless it is made more specific.
Appellant did not raise this matter concerning the
words ''invalid and inferior'' by any motion prior to
pre-trial. He did not raise the issue at pre-trial (pretrial order, R. 9-11), neither did he raise the matter at
the beginning of the trial (R. 26), at the conclusion of
plaintiff's case (R. 67-70), at the conclusion of the trial
(R. 86), nor at any point during trial (R. 26-86).
Certainly had such a minor defect (if it is such) been
brought to light it could have been readily cured. Such
a defect is not prejudicial error, but is a mere technical
question involving semantics.
(B) THE ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT IS NOT DEFECT'IVE.
It is remarkable that appellant in his Point 4 only
quotes a portion of plaintiff's complaint in order to make
his point. He omits the very wording which he claims is
not alleged in the complaint. He concludes then that
the mere words ''invalid and inferior'' are inadequate in
expressing the adverse nature of appellant's claim.
The full allegation of the complaint wherein I have
italicized the omitted portion is as follows:
'' 3. That plainliff is the legal and equitable owner
of atnd in the exclusive possession and entitled to
possession of said property; that the defendants
named herein, both known and unknown,. claim or
ma,y claim some interest in and to sa.id property
1.0
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ADVERSE to that of the plaintiff, but that said
<'iaimrd interest of said defendant is invalid and is
inferior to the right, title and interest of the plaintiff in and to said property ... (R. 2, 3).

The complaint clearly alleged therefore that any inh'rl'st claimed by the defendants was adverse to the ownN~hip of the plaintiff. Appellant mistakenly concludes
that such language is just not proper.
To further support his specious argument appellant
eites l r orley v. Peterson., 80 Utah 27, 41, 12 P. 2d 579,
:>8-t However, that case holds just opposite to appellant's statement of the holding. The Worley case holds
that even if the complaint had insufficiently alleged the
adversity of the defendants' claim such defect was cured
by the defendant in its answer wherein he claims title to
the property. This obviously would be our case even if
the complaint had not alleged the adverse nature of appellant's claim, since Appellant claims title adverse to
that of respondent.
Even so in the Worley case there was no allegation
that the defendants' claim was adverse - merely an
allegation that the claim was inferior. We can only conclude that a cursory look at our complaint and also at
the court's opinion in the Worley case demonstrates that
appellant is mistaken both as to the fact and the law
under this point.
POINT IV
APPELLANT IS BARRED BY THE FOURYEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
11

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(A) THERE IS NO ABANDONMENT OF
THE FOUR-YEAR STA.TUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Title 78-12-5.1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, limits
the time within which appellant in this case could assert
any defense against respondents, to four years after
the date of the tax deed, unless, of course, appellant was
actually occupying or in possession of the land within
that four-year period. The evidence shows and the court
properly found that appellant was not in possession or
in occupancy of the land within said four-year period or
actually since 1949 (R. 14, 15). Plaintiff, in its complaint,
did not need to plead this statute of limitations. Harnsen. v.
Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884. At the pre-trial,
see paragraph 10 of the pre-trial order (R. 10), the issue
of the statute of limitations was set forth. During the
trial the statute of limitations was interjected into the
case (R. 31, 52, 68). The memorandum decision is couched
in terms of said statute (R. 12, 13).
The Findings of Fact certainly set forth sufficient
facts to warrant the conclusions that the defendant has
no rights or claim in the property or against the plaintiff.
The specific grounds need not be stated in the decree if
the facts and law are in support thereof.
(B) RESPONDENTS' TITLE STEMS FROM
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY TAX
DEED.

Pre-trial Exhibit 4 is the auditor's tax deed issued
February 28, 1939, by virtue of a previous tax sale and
pursuant to authority of Section 80-10-66 Utah Revised
12

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Statutes of 1933 This. statute made said deed prima facie
evidPll<'l' of the matters and proceedings therein stated

and

preredin~

the execution of said deed.

rrhe deed from Salt Lake County dated December
:n, 1D-t~, executed pursuant to Title 80, Chapter 10, Section 68, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is prima facie evidence of all of the prior proceedings leading up to the
execution of said deed.
There can be no doubt but that Falconaero has
acquired the property under the tax deed and is claiming
a tax title. Certainly each of the two deeds indicates
their execution in ''the course of a statutory proceeding.''
See Title 78-12-5.3 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Each
deed refers specifically to that portion of the Revenue and
Taxation statutes governing redemption from tax sales.

Notwithsta.nding the clear language quoted by Mr.
Callister to the effect that the tax title may be ''valid or
im·nlid" he nevertheless contends that respondents were
required to prove the complete validity of the entire tax
~ale proceeding. Obviously, if there were no defects in
this procedure we would not be concerned about adverse
possession and the tax title would be perfect.
Appellant's counsel at top of page 18 of his Brief
states with such certainty "this is the law ... " that we
must assume he is the authority in this field of law. He
apparently deems it unnecessary to cite any cases in support of such a proclamation. Certainly Anson v. Ellison,
104 Utah 576, 140 P. 2d 653 does not support his con-
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tention. In that case the (teed was issued under Title
80-10-68 prior to 1939 when such statute had no provision
relating to the prima facie effect of the deed. Our deed
was executed pursuant to Section 80-10-66 which did have
such a provision relating to the prima facie effect of
the deed.
However, whether we consider the county deed to be
a tax deed or not is immaterial. In Cope v. Bountiful Livestock Co., 13 Utah 2d 20, 368 P. 2d 68, this court held that
the invalidity of the tax deed was immaterial in upholding the adverse possession and that the claim of title
under the deed was all that was required. Also, in Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P. 2d 814, the court,
in holding that the tax title need not be perfect, stated,
"This contention is answered by the observations above
to the effect that title technically need not pass to protect a tax title claimant.... ''
Thus, the fact that respondents claim under the tax
deed, and not whether the tax procedure was perfect, is
the important factor which brings into play the four-year
statute of limitations.
POINT V
RESPONDENT HAS ESTABLISHED ADVERSE POSSESSION.
(A) ADVERSE POSSESSION IS AMPLY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Title 78-12-9 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets forth
the elements of adverse possession when claimed under a

14
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written instrument, any one of which is sufficient to sustain n title by adverse possession. By uncontroverted
eviJence respondent has conclusively proven more than
one of the elements. These statutory elements proven in
this case and found by the court in the Findings of Fact
are as follows:
1. LOJYtd cultivated or improved. Mr. Darrel Firmage
testified that the land was leveled and drainage ditches
placed thereon ( R. 40).
~.

Protection by a substantial enclosure. Mr. Bennett, :Mr. Andy Firmage and Mr. Darrell Firmage all
testified that beginning in 1948 and continuing to 1963 the
land was fenced by a barbed wire and electric wire fence
and that said fencing was maintained for the purpose of
keeping stock grazing on the land (R. 31-34, 43, 57, 61, Exhibit P. 29). The nature of the land and the fencing shown
by the photographs and testified to by Mr. Knowlton all
conclusively prove that the fencing was certainly open
and ,·isible (R. 79, 80).

3. Pasturage. It is clear that from 1948 on through
1963 the land was used for pasturing the riding horses
and for riding, all in connection with the overall development of the land owned by Falconaero (R. 40-42, 54, 62,
Exhibits P. 22-26). These financial records for the company show receipts year after year for the pasturage and
expenses for fencing, (Exhibit P. 29), which are the
financial account cards, show horse rental and pasturing
O\er the years in question.
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The land in question is situate on the interior of an
entire tract of land owned by Falconero (Exhibit P. 5).
The land surrounding the subject 20 acres, as well as the
land outside of the thousand-acre tract of land, is essentially pasture land (Exhibit P. 8 through P. 18). Appellant, however compares the land to the Industrial Center,
formerly the Arms Plant and the large buildings situate
thereon which lie to the North of this property and North
of 21st South Street. Appellant seems to contend that
unless Falconero had used the thousand acres including
the Chuck Wagon, the lake and the pasture land for some
sort of industrial endeavor that the use would not be adequate for adverse possession. Such a position is extreme
to say the least and without legal authority. Furthermore, it is completely beyond the statutory provisions
relating to adverse possession cited above.
(B) THE TAXES ARE PAID FOR SEVEN
YEARS.

Respondent promptly paid all of the general taxes
on the land from 1955 through 1961 for a total of seven
years (Exhibit P. 20). In addition the respondent had
paid the taxes, although said taxes were delinquent from
1949 through 1954 (R. 68, 69). The adverse possession
occurred not only during the seven years during >;rhich
taxes were paid, but also during the prior period from
1949 through 1954. All of the evidence to support the
foregoing facts is uncontroverted, is substantial and is
more than sufficient to sustain the adverse possession
ruling of the lower court.
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(C) APPELLANT IS BARRED BY THE

SEVEN YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Title 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-6 require that one seeking
Pither in a complaint or a counterclaim to rcover possession of real property shall have been seized thereof within seven years prior to bringing the action or interposing
the defense. There is absolutely no proof that appellant
has been seized of this property within said seven year
pNiod. To the contrary, the evidence is uncontroverted
that appellant has not been in occupancy or possession of
the property within that period. Therefore, it is inescapable that appellant is barred from asserting any claim
in said property.

SUMMARY
When Falconaero, through the Firmages, has purrhased the property pursuant to tax deeds from Salt Lake
County, has changed the property in its entirety, has used
the property for pasturing and for the development of an
overall recreation area, all occurring over the continuous
period from 1949 to the beginning of the lawsuit, it seems
strange indeed that appellant can contend that such usage
does not constitute open, adverse and notorious possession. Appellant tlthough acquiring a quit claim deed
from an heir of the prior record owner has neither established a record title to the property nor has it established
any possession or occupancy or even a claim thereof.
The evidence therefore precludes appellant from challenging the title and possession of respondent.
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The questions raised by appellant relating to allegations and the sufficiency of the complaint are more in
the nature of last-minute technical objections, and they
are completely without merit or equity. They are an attempt by fiction to require respondent to commence the
action anew. These objections as to the technicalities not
only are without merit, but they do not serve as prejudicial errors subject to appeal.
Respondents respectfully submit that the appellant's
arguments are completely without merit and that the
judgment of the lower court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
BY-----------------------------------------------------------ELLIOTT LEE PRATT

Attorneys for
Pla,intiff s-Respondents
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